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This essay is on the structure of war and how it in the process of making the other party, the 
opponents, killable dehumanizes them, pushes them beyond the periphery of humanity. In the 
very process of doing so, they rip apart the logic of being human i.e., the rationale which 
symbolically represents the supposed essence of humanness, thereby turning the process of 
dehumanization back to their own selves. In the process of gobbling up the other as animal, as 
non-human, as killable and violable, the self takes the form and shape of its imagined other. 
What it attempts to exclude remains always already included as an epistemological absence in 
the structure of reasoning. The perspective of modern warfare gradually shifts its attention from 
terror as external to terror as internal. Both nation-state and the globe get defined in terms of 
peace and security provided by the sovereign who would assure liberty, right to life, and the 
maintenance of order. The notion of outside threat and the concept of warring nations, after the 
two world wars, get eroded by the very fact that all the major powers have enough of nuclear 
weapon at their hand to invite the dooms day. Therefore international peace and negotiation 
become a ploy for deferring the moment of the end of symbolic order, the proper name for which 
becomes humanity. The nuclear winter looms large and every step is taken to ensure that peace is 
maintained at any cost. Management becomes the new tool of governance and control. In this 
situation when all major powers are negotiating with each other, terror can only emerge from the 
“inside”. This “inside” is something on which the sovereign confers the right to life and therefore 
also the right to take away life, both literally and/or metaphorically i.e. by pushing outside the 
symbolic boundaries of humanity – making him/her monstrous, alien, outcaste and a threat to 
humanity. The moment of humanization coincides therefore with the moment of animalization. 
This essay addresses the violence that may erupt in the regime of peace, where the opponents to 
this regime, the vanquished who do not have any cards to play may turn to total terror, thereby 
inviting a total collapse of state and international power’s structure of reasoning. This essay shall 
mention a very brief episode in the Mahabharata, where we witness total terror and 
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unaccountable violence, which is not directed towards any reasonable gain. It illustrates how the 
absolute power of the opposition – the absolute capacity to govern becomes the turning point of 
transforming its “other”, its adversary in the form and guise of terror. The absoluteness of reason 
produces absolute unreason.  
Here I shall try to talk about the need for politicization of animals, both literally as well 
as in the extended metaphorical sense of the non-humans – the dehumanized and the expendable 
entities of the modern state and governance. I shall also talk about the need for animalization of 
politics or the need for bringing in the animal question into politics in order to interrogate the 
apparently static norms of being human in any given society. At this moment I am not going into 
the details of the relationship between the human and the non-human (here the category of non-
human includes both God and the animal, following Derrida’s lectures on The Beast and the 
Sovereign, Volume-1 where he shows the closeness of animality and divinity in their respective 
relations to the sovereign). But there has been a movement from the pre-modern to the modern 
regimes of power where the question of animal has been rationalized and therefore invisibilized. 
Here invisibilization is deployed as a theoretical move to distinguish from simply becoming 
invisible, as this form of invisibilization shares a dichotomous relationship with visibilization or 
simply making visible. Invisibilization is not simply opposite to the process of visibilization. 
Rather the reasonable structure of making certain things visible has the politics of making certain 
other things invisible. The theoretical deployment of the essence of man in western 
enlightenment modernity actually invisibilizes the always already existence of its supposed 
binary opposite of animal within that very formation. The visibility of categorical markers causes 
certain invisibilization. It is called invisibilization as it shares an inseparable relationship with 
visibility and is not simply a binary opposite to it. Modernity while claims to enlighten every 
aspect of the globe is capable of hiding darkness that rests underneath. In the pre-modern forms 
of power, the subject was always subjected to the divine principles and shared the relationship of 
a sheep to the shepherd. From this, the modern democratic form of governance marks a shift 
where being human is rationalized in terms of a need for security of individual human subjects 
which shall be protected by the sovereign. Thus the role of both divine powers to intervene and 
the animal irrationality get bracketed out in this system. My study following the steps of 
Foucault, Agamben and Derrida will illustrate that this bracketing out is apparent and the specter 
of the non-human still continues to haunt the modernity we live today. Finally it will try to talk 
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about a reconfiguration of both politics and modernity in terms of a constant continuous 
engagement and negotiation with the traces of animality that haunt each and every moment of 
human self-definition. Politics is here this process of negotiation that approaches towards an 
ethics and justice which is always incomplete and unattainable, yet which has to be approached 
nonetheless. This would also attempt to redefine and rethink how the literary (abstracted from 
the notion of literature) can represent the impossible structural relationship between the subject 
and object of violence. This would show how the collapse of the division of subject and object in 
the moment of terror can be translated into the literary – how the impossible moment of terror 
and violence itself is literary in its aporetic performance (in the sense that it is not possible to 
transcend violence and terror through human structure of reasoning as the former is instituted 
within the latter and therefore any attempt to do so creates and unpassable pass – an aporia. 
Literature performs such aporia instead of actually finding textbook solutions to terror – it 
performs the terrifying animal always already within the category of the human – how literature 
is a moment of deferring the terror that is the absolute alterity to the global being and its 
symbolic order. The article will point out how literature can force us towards the moment of 
terror indulging us to encounter the non-symbolizable.  
(1) 
After the war of Kurukhsetra was almost over and the knee-broken Duryadhona was 
waiting for his last breath, Ashvatthama was made the new general of the war, which apparently 
wass assumed to have ended. In grief, remorse and anger for the loss of near and dear ones in the 
war, in the dark of the night, inside the forest, sleepless Ashvatthama witnessed suddenly an owl 
ravaging the nests of the crows, killing them mercilessly in sleep when they were totally 
unprepared. Ashvatthama learned how to defeat enemies in advantageous position. When man 
has no other means he takes resort to violence, goes against all forms of ordered arrangements 
which make life meaningful and human. Man faces his own animality at the moment of crises, 
goes back to the state of lawless nature, arrives at a decision which is outside the structural 
imperatives in which one lives and is marked by the suddenness of animal reaction. This episode 
of the Mahabharata called “Sauptika-parva
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(Vedavyasha 497-516) or “The book of sleep” illustrates how man reacts instead of 
responding to a situation which compulsively takes away all his possibilities of engaging 
in a dialogue with reason. It is a situation when reason is asleep and violence becomes the 
rule of the game. However reason and violence are not separable just like humanity and 
animality. At the heart of reason resides the unreason of force which compulsively makes 
one give up to such reasoning. After great wars of the world are over with Hiroshima day, 
and each nation state of earth has learnt to live within its boundaries, strategies of 
maintaining peace become new kind of war. State machineries work towards that. 
Hannah Arendt shows how wars continue in the form of revolution after the Second 
World War (Arendt 1990: 11-20). Nation states have become violently hegemonic to 
manage the diversities within, as threat was perceived more and more to be internal than 
external. Particularly after a war, when external threat is resolved, the only threat 
perceived is that against hegemony of the state – its sovereignty which has to be 
maintained. Above all, violence becomes exemplary to war. Arendt comments: “It would 
be difficult  to deny  that one of  the  reasons why  wars  have  turned so easily  into  
revolutions  and why  revolutions  have  shown  this  ominous  inclination  to  unleash  
wars  is that  violence  is  a  kind  of  common  denominator  for  both” (Arendt 18). 
Foucault would suggest that maintenance of peace is itself a kind of war and involves the 
violence of a certain kind of reason. Derrida in his book Rogues has carefully 
demonstrated how behind any legal framework there is a founding violence. Law 
functions as law as there is force behind it which is justified through a particular form of 
reason. However this force forces one to obey the law. But what happens when this legal 
structure itself is threatened? In its defense the sovereign executes its right to suspend law 
– to avoid descending into a state of nature, and in doing so itself initiates the very 
appearance of that state of nature – animality that is primordial to the constitution of this 
legal framework – the animality of primitive force. This is autoimmunity of modern state 
which in order to provide security to its subject, to save them from going down to the 
state of nature, unleashes violence within itself – it kills in order to protect. The principle 
of the modern state is to produce killable entities – antibodies within. Donna Harraway in 
her essay “Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies” has shown how the postmodern 
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conceptualization of “the body as a strategic system…a highly mobile field of strategic 
differences” (1991: 211) is complicit with global imagination of political bodies. 
Therefore on one hand there is an acceptance of the existence of the animal/outsider/other 
within the human self but on the other there is an attempt to manage that 
animal/outsider/other by removal or quarantine – by execution or confinement. However 
the question is: if this animality can effectively be confined or killed or does it come back 
to haunt? If behind the power of the sovereign is the founding violence – the animal force 
which makes one obey – then the traces of that originary moment continues to haunt the 
sovereign. Whoever violates the legal structure sanctioned by the sovereign parodies the 
formation of sovereign itself, which conceals and denies the animality within. Animality 
is the principle for the formation of the Being of the sovereign in terms of its exclusion. 
To parody that animal within becomes then an act of re-enacting the sovereign which 
poses a threat to the sovereign. In the face of that threat the sovereign has to give up its 
self-justificatory juridico-politics and bring out its innermost animality and confront its 
own non-being. In the very next step he has to dramatize the killing of that animal. This 
initiates the production of bare life which is killable and therefore symbolically helps in 
purging the sovereign from its animality in a performance of “self” preservation. The act 
of suppressing revolutions is the act of saving the openness of “Being” of politics from 
sliding into undisclosable animal. Health of the political body is restored by performing 
the elimination of the animals/viruses/bad genes/rebels. However, as state reserves the 
sovereign right to transform any person into bare life by turning its immune system 
against its own subjects, the subjects react by revolting against such biopolitical 
reductionism by rejecting the sovereign. The subjects refuse such animalization and turn 
it back towards the state. To resist violence they become violent themselves. They parody 
the hidden animality of the sovereign which maintains its authority by animal force. 
Derrida points out in Rogues that America’s war against rogue states nonetheless exposes 
its own status of being rogue – its dependence on force which is hidden behind its 
apparent claim of peace making. The so-called rogue states of course don’t think 
themselves to be rogues, rather they claim US government to be acting as such. This is 
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the irony of both state and revolution who in order to combat animality embrace it and 
take recourse to it.  
 Unlike animals who instinctively can identify and kill the other – who react when 
face an attack but cannot respond - who apparently do not think in terms of having a 
Being which experiences and also makes meaning out of that experience – man faces the 
critical problem of defining the other. Man has to think the other to define his own self – 
to give a boundary and meaning to his Being. But this act of determining the Being is 
done through Being itself. This being is as defined by Heidegger existentially determined 
dasein or ‘being there’. It is already determined by its external world where it is thrown. 
Therefore the Being is already charged by traces of its other – the other beings of the 
world. However in an ironic cyclicality, in order to define itself, this conscious but 
existentially determined Being has to define and determine the other beings – to separate 
and externalize them. These other beings however continue to haunt the self/the Being as 
markings, as traces. Moreover these other beings cannot but be determined by this Being 
who thinks and therefore appropriates everything else according to its need. However this 
appropriation is partial as Being itself is simultaneously determined by other beings 
which it appropriates. Both are in a state of becoming. Animality is that mark of non-self 
which determines the self but which is attempted to be kept outside the self. Heidegger as 
Roberto Esposito shows would not meddle with that animality which is inscrutable to 
human understanding (Esposito 2008: 146-194). He would rather be interested in the 
openness of man’s own Being which can interpret itself and can engage with possibilities 
of becoming. But for Heidegger this Being is dasein or being there – it is existentially 
determined. Heidegger thinks of ontology as the first philosophy – he ontologizes Being 
in terms of its existence. This existence is that which individuates the Being. It seems 
existence is something tangible, present at hand. In order to counteract the metaphysics of 
presence Heidegger gives existence almost a status of presence. Agamben has discussed 
in this context how the Open of man’s Being is determined by it and can also understand 
it. But is it possible to give boundary to existence? Is it feasible to keep the undisclosable 
animality outside the Being? Heideggerian approach is imperative of an exclusion of 
animality which is almost like Kantian being-in-itself. Agamben shows how the very 
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notion of the open can push us towards a crisis. As modern states acknowledge the 
presence of elements disruptive to its secured Being, existentially determined as a 
construction; as it sees its political body as a strategic site of negotiations, it tries to bring 
the undisclosable animality – the other of humanity, of politics within its surveillance. 
Sovereign policies of postmodern societies are directed towards dealing with such 
animality – to bring it into the open. If the Being is haunted by non-being that is 
unpredictable, if liberal democracies are haunted by rogue-states which are impossible to 
be accommodated within its already given structure of reasoning, then the challenge is to 
invent technologies of self-management to manage the enemy within. This form of 
securitization is called autoimmunity. This is to time and again, like anti-virus softwares, 
select the malicious programs within the state – identify them and then eliminate them. 
Whatever is redundant to the survival and health of modern nation-state, whatever is a 
potential threat to its Being has to be quarantined and eliminated. The modern state is 
therefore always predicated upon a fear of falling apart by its internal abortive elements – 
it is compelled to maintain its openness in the face of the undisclosable. The US 
governmentality therefore faces deep crisis regarding those who can never be 
hegemonized – those who cannot be accommodated within the pervasive scheme of 
liberal democracy. Just like computer anti-virus programs they therefore engage in 
producing codes for identifying the illiberal, the primitive and the savage other of 
humanity – the turbans, beards and names pertaining to Islam. In the post-humanist age 
of knowing and acknowledging human self as a construction determined by its existence, 
in an age when much of our faith on a secured pre-given subject has waned out it 
becomes imperative that such existence can be managed shaping and securing the subject 
in formation – giving a teleology to that subject. Anything that is perceived by modern 
liberal democracy as disruptive to the formation and maintenance of this liberal 
democratic subject, who ought to participate in world market of economic exchange, is 
thought of as apolitical, as outside the existential situatedness of modern subjectivity and 
therefore by default is characterized by animality - as enemy within which has to be 
combated.  
 
Sanglap: Journal of Literary and Cultural Inquiry  Volume 1: Issue 1  
 
84 www.sanglap-journal.in  Editors: Sourit Bhattacharya & Arka Chattopadhyay 
 
 
(2) 
 A newspaper report of the Mail Online published on May 9, 2011 gives an 
account of a soldier who was an Iraq war veteran and is serving “five terms of life 
imprisonment for raping and killing a 14-year-old Iraqi girl and killing her parents and 
sister”1. He defends himself before the trial by saying “he didn't think of Iraqi civilians as 
humans after being exposed to extreme warzone violence.” Pressed by the order of 
violence he was regimented to think Iraqis as non-humans. When total management of 
life becomes the principle of new world order anyone and everyone can be a potential 
animal who can simply be killed. The fundamental irony of the Being of man is that 
unlike animals it knows what an animal is and what is not. In human world of meaningful 
perception he always has to determine the other of humanity to define itself. Agamben 
comments: “The open is nothing but a grasping of the animal not-open. Man suspends his 
animality and, in this way, opens a “free and empty” zone in which life is captured and a-
ban-doned {ab-bandonata} in a zone of exception” (Agamben 2004: 79). However this 
animality comes back to revenge its elimination. The other cannot be killed and all 
autoimmune processes are unsuccessful, as the animal other is not dissociable from the 
human self. In a two-step move the modern art of governance first acknowledges the 
animal within all human systems of survival and then initiates its management through 
elimination or captivation. However this produces an aporia, as the first step makes the 
second one impossible. If animal is intrinsic to humanity then how can it be separated and 
killed? It is bound to come back. The US soldier to kill the non-human, to avoid death 
that was reality for him every moment turned inhuman, stripped himself off the laws of 
humanity. Agamben comments: “It is not easy to say whether the humanity that has taken 
upon itself the mandate of the total management of its own animality is still human, in the 
sense of that humanitas which the anthropological machine produced by deciding every 
time between man and animal…To be sure, such a humanity, from Heidegger’s 
perspective, no longer has the form of keeping itself open to the undisconcealed of the 
animal, but seeks rather to open and secure the not-open in every domain, and thus closes 
itself to its own openness, forgets its  humanitas, and makes being its speciﬁc 
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disinhibitor. The total humanization of the animal coincides with a total animalization of 
man” (Agamben 77). Steven Green, the convicted soldier said, “I was crazy…I was just 
all the way out there. I didn't think I was going to live.”  
The shadow of death is primordial to one’s realization of one’s own animality – 
the immolation of the physical body which poses a threat to the total management of life. 
However in Heideggerian idiom death is also one’s own-most experience which cannot 
be shared – it individuates oneself – gives meaning to his existence – boundary to one’s 
Being. Man can make his own death meaningful – he is conscious of his being as he is 
conscious of his death that will take away his being. Animality and humanity are 
bounded together by death. To separate death out of the sphere of life – to make killing 
the norm for somebody and survival the rule for others, as we see in modern biopolitics 
(which is at the same time thanatopolitics as well), is to separate the animal from 
humanity. When death is perceived as a principle in producing this Being and giving it 
meaning then absolute desire for securitization – freeing oneself from death apparently – 
is autoimmunity that is waging war against oneself. Therefore the state waging war 
against its subjects tries to secure them. We have to acknowledge that all battles whose 
war cry is security is someway or other directed against its own self and all violence 
against the other is in a way directed against oneself. The self carries the traces of the 
other – the animal, as life carries the shadow of death. So neither separation of animality 
from humanity, nor accepting animality as inseparably linked with the humanity can help 
us deal with the philosophical problem of autoimmunity. Agamben has pointed out that 
the total management of animality within has rendered the separation of human-animal 
impossible. The obverse is also true that is if we think in terms of separation of animal-
human then we deny the animal within. The art of governance in hegemonic states 
combines the two in an aporetic moment – it acknowledges animality as within the 
rational self as an element of undecidable and then tries to separate it, identify it, manage 
it, quarantine it and if necessary kill it.  
It is important however to think of combining these two contrary impulses to 
think of animality as within humanity, but also try to separate the two. But this has to be 
thought of as an attempt which is non-actualizable – as an impossible possibility. It 
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requires the recognition of animality at each and every attempt of separating it. The 
recognition of animality within helps one negotiate with it. The confidence of being 
human as we see in the American soldier would fall easy prey of identifying the animal in 
others and in the process of doing so denying his own humanity. I define humanity here 
in terms of Derrida as responsibility towards the animal which is within.2 Humanity is 
purely situational and depends upon how one responds to a situation. Each situation 
forces us to confront the animal within and responding to it we become human. 
Otherwise we fall in the trap of rationalizing our animality – managing it or killing it 
bythe   discourse of reason. When Ashvatthama got inspired by the owl which killed its 
prey in the middle of the night, he picked up the rationale of attacking the enemy in sleep 
and justified his uncle by saying that it is the duty of warrior class to annihilate the enemy 
in whatever means. His moment of confrontation with the animal, which reacts and 
cannot respond, probes him to rationalize, interpret and bring the animal action he 
witnesses within the structure of his meaning. The moment of confronting the animal 
therefore becomes also the denial of it. However this denial comes back to him and he 
animalizes itself, as Rudra (the god of death and the underworld who is also pashupati, 
the god of animals) enters him to enable him kill his unprepared enemies at night. Just 
like the American soldier, he thinks his enemy in terms of the crows killed by the owl but 
doesn’t realize that; in this process he becomes like the owl – embodies the animal which 
ironically he believes he is not. Derrida in his book The Animal that Therefore I Am 
destabilizes the notion of conscious modern subject. In Rogues he has already 
demonstrated how US war against rogue states exposes its own hidden but fundamental 
rogueness on which its liberal democracy is predicated. In The Animal that Therefore I 
Am he shows how the “I am”, the cogito, is born by negotiating with its animality. The 
title of the book parodies Descartes’s “cogito ergo sum” – “I think therefore I am” where 
the thinking “I” qualifies the “I” of the Being. Derrida asserts how each moment of self-
recognition has to pass through recognition of one’s own animality. Each act of defining 
oneself as different from the animal passes through a recognition of one’s animality, 
which is identified as animality in the process of meaning making. This act of meaning 
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making involves a double bind of human-animal. Being human is about not being animal. 
This non-being-animal follows the human animal for not sliding into it. Being is shot by 
this animality and has to be responsible to it. Responsibility is not simply an act of 
responding to a response but also to a non-response – to whatever is undisclosable to 
human openness. The open should therefore constitute remaining open to the 
undisclosable of the animal and not to make it open. When the hegemonic world order 
declared the end of history and when our postmodern consciousness realizes that the 
disclosure of whatever cannot be brought within the purview of knowledge, the tendency 
is towards a naturalized violence both by the state and its adversaries. Tendencies to 
clean the inside from animal aberrations become imperative in a world order where peace 
has to be maintained at any cost. In this situation Agamben suggests a different reading of 
politics through his reading of Benjamin’s letters. He comments: “Ideas—which, like 
stars, “shine only in the night of nature”—gather creatural life not in order to reveal it, 
nor to open it to human language, but rather to give it back to its closedness and 
muteness.” (Agamben 81) This suggests being responsible to the other – the animal 
within, which is at the heart of all forms of meaning making. Agamben with Benjamin 
prefers nature over history – nature which is not a Hobbesian state of violent nature 
where impulses rule, but a space which forces us to think of the animal impulses which 
are within human selves and societies and at the same time closed to human meaning 
making apparatuses. Rather meaning making is a process which happens through a 
negotiation and separation of that closedness. Benjamin associated the recognition of 
such closedness with the work of art. Agamben comments: “nature, as the world of 
closedness (Verschlossenheit) and of the night, is opposed to history as the sphere of 
revelation (Offenbarung). But to the closed sphere of nature Benjamin—surprisingly—
also ascribes ideas as well as works of art. Indeed, these last are deﬁned “as models of a 
nature that awaits no day, and thus no Judgment Day; they are the models of a nature that 
is neither the theater of history nor the dwelling place of man. The saved night [Die 
gerettete Nacht]”” (Agamben 83). Night is where this essay started – night of war, killing 
and suffering – it is night when the owl flies and catches its prey. Here it won’t be 
irrelevant to quote from a Bengali poet Jibanananda Das who writes on how a person 
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committed suicide to escape boredom of existence, or rather what we can call too much 
of existence – a situation where existence itself acts as a foreclosure – an impossibility of 
any form of transcendence. He as a poet, a seer, associates and collaborates himself with 
a predatory owl and hopes to fly with him in the middle of the night when the moon is 
down: 
 
O profound grandmother, is it wonderful still? 
I too shall grow old like you, 
Despatch the hag-moon across the Kalidaha at flood-tide: 
Together we shall leave empty the vast storehouse of life. (Das 49) 
 
The poet knows that the social symbolic which gives man its humanness is 
contingent. The idea of the poetic – the literary is to fly with the ravenous owl – an 
inclusivity of the always already predatory animal in each of us. It is both a realization of 
the animal within and also by acknowledging the same indulging into an ethics of the 
care for the other – the animal within. This animal is not external to our human selves but 
haunts our selves. While immense securitization of selves may indulge suicide to destroy 
the symbolic to which one is chained, the poetic choice is to invoke the literary mode of 
flying with the predator bird to participate in the natural cycle of violence that is 
inescapable. The inescapability of violence may indulge new ethics of responsibility 
towards the non-human animal other which is within and which haunts our apparently 
secured self. There are several strategies of dealing with the compulsive world order, the 
total management of life which captivates or kills the animal within. One is to assert the 
ego against the existence to secure one’s humanity and individuality from repetitive 
structure of governance which sees every man as potential 
animal/inhuman/savage/terrorist. However, to secure such total humanity one ironically 
turns back to the animal violation of reason which he renders reasonable and humane 
though, as we see in Ashvatthama. Another strategy is to commit suicide and end the 
trauma of being haunted by the animality one cannot escape. But ironically again death 
gives us our humanity as we think about it, and reaching death is the end of this process 
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of thinking through death and therefore becoming non-human and animal. The thinking 
of death is the thinking of freedom, but the moment of death is total annihilation – the 
Being doesn’t remain to determine its freedom. If for Agamben behind each biopolitical 
arrangement lurks the thanatopolitical then for Mbembe the thanatopolitics has to be 
replaced by a politics of dead bodies – a necropolitics when death becomes a reality of 
any and every moment. Suicide bombers combine the above two modes of escapades in a 
singularity – it becomes a simultaneous act of killing and being killed in an existential 
condition where death is the only reality of life. Mbembe writes: “Death in the present is 
the mediator of redemption. Far from being an encounter with a limit, boundary, or 
barrier, it is experienced as “a release from terror and bondage.” Gilroy suggests that 
death in this case can be represented as agency. For death is precisely that from and over 
which I have power. But it is also that space where freedom and negation operate.” 
(2003: 39) Here the distinction between the beast and the sovereign collapses. The 
beast/terrorist becomes sovereign by its animal force but also the same sovereign is killed 
like a beast. The only way to deal with this terror is however to think humanity in terms 
of “nature, as the world of closedness and of the night”. By collaborating with the 
predatory owl who kills without thinking and meaning – who kills without sense of 
enmity one can live, if not a life of non-violence but of non-cruelty where one knows that 
one has to kill to survive, one has to name and give boundary to one’s own self but one 
cannot strike out the animal, cannot make simply killable what one is not and what one 
cannot accommodate into his world of meaning. One has to be responsible to the 
animality to deal with the crisis of autoimmunity. The crisis of autoimmunity is such that 
it makes metaphoricity impossible. The capacity of the sovereign to ‘become’ ‘like’ 
animal if necessary is only a fantasy as each sovereign is subjected to power – to the 
apparatus of state and civility which is abstract and which functions on the principal of 
producing its outside – its exception. It is therefore impossible to distinguish between the 
animal and the human in modern state apparatus as the one can always be 
metamorphosed into the other. It shares a relationship of metamorphosis instead of 
metaphoricity. Deleuze and Guattari in their discussion of Kafka’s work write:  
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Metamorphosis is the contrary of metaphor… it is no longer the subject of 
enunciation who is "like" a beetle, the subject of the statement remaining a 
man. Rather, there is a circuit of states that forms a mutual becoming, in 
the heart of a necessarily multiple or collective assemblage. (1986: 21-22) 
 
The modern state apparatus invisibilizes this metamorphosis by producing the illusion of 
free rational human subjects. Therefore it would be a philosophical-political act to 
question such reasonable production of the boundaries of human and focus on the 
apparently impossible counter-possibility of redefining such boundaries territorialized by 
the sovereign power structure.  
I will conclude my discussion referring to a short story by Bangladeshi writer 
Muhammad Jafar Iqbal, titled “Chhelemanushi” (in English that would mean 
“Immaturity”). The story is about a utopian world where cannibalism is sanctioned and 
humans are cultivated in farms for daily consumption. In all other respects, the society 
seems similar to ours. One fine morning a man purchases a boy of 16 to eat. Somehow 
the meal gets deferred and the boy stays in his household. We see an emotional 
attachment growing between the person’s wife and the boy. The boy is wild as “it” is 
grown up in a farm. After some time, the man’s brother-in-law comes to visit and when 
he knows about his sister’s attachment with the boy, he laughs and says that it is 
irrational to incur such feelings – it is a sign of chhelemanushi or immaturity. The 
brother-in-law finally kills the boy and prepares a good meal. The wife could not enjoy 
the meal properly. After years of this event, everybody used to laugh, including the wife 
herself, about such supposed immature behavior she showed at that moment. The 
consumption of human flesh can be read here as an extended metaphor for a certain kind 
of political rationality which can conceptualize anybody or anything as consumable and 
killable – as animal, assuming it to be outside all forms of politics. While the structure of 
sovereignty always operates on exclusion and needs such exclusion to define what man is 
and who is supposed to enjoy the rights of being human, politics can be redefined as an 
approach to question this limit. While the limits of the political cannot be erased, political 
practice would always attempt to stretch such limits. After witnessing the fallacy of 
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political maturity and reasoning of both the state and its violent adversaries which in the 
name of security or revolution can kill so many, render so many the status of being 
killable and in turn become animal itself, it is important to rethink modernity. Modernity 
is not simply about rationalization of who is supposed to be the political subject, but to 
try to move beyond such rational limits in any given time and space. Thinking in terms of 
recognizing the animal within which one escapes to become human but which continues 
to haunt the very process becoming human can reshape the political thinking. It might 
help us to think how we must respond to the question of how to provide justice to a war 
criminal like the US soldier mentioned in this essay. It might help the sovereign to 
rethink ways of dealing with criminals, refugees, outsiders, non-citizens who are within 
the city state but not as a part of it. To assert the political identity of oneself one has to 
define the I-ness not in terms of presence but in terms of the animal within and start with 
the conviction “The animal that therefore I am”. Literary here as we see in the discussion 
of the story becomes a re-organization of our desire. It is a shift in the paradigm of the 
social symbolic inside which we produce boundaries of human and the animal – the 
rational self and the non-cognizable, mute yet horrifying other. The task of the literary is 
to push us towards the moment of symbolic crises – the moment of terror without ever 
actualizing it. Therefore Derrida conceptualizes all literary criticism as nuclear criticism. 
This is because in the aftermath of nuclear threat the only way to approach terror that is 
non-cognizable and beyond the symbolic is through the literary. Derrida comments: 
 
This absolute referent of all possible literature is on a par with the 
absolute effacement of any possible trace; it is thus the only 
ineffaceable trace, it is so as the trace of what is entirely other…The 
only "subject" of all possible literature, of all possible criticism, its 
only ultimate and a-symbolic referent, unsymbolizable, even 
unsignifiable; this is,  if not the nuclear age, if not the nuclear 
catastrophe, at least that toward which nuclear discourse and the 
nuclear symbolic are still beckoning: the remainderless and a-
symbolic destruction of literature. Literature and literary criticism 
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cannot speak of anything else, they can have no other ultimate 
referent, they can only multiply their strategic maneuvers in order to 
assimilate that unassimilable wholly other. (Derrida 1984: 28) 
 
Thus in the face of total annihilation literary becomes the strategy of multiplying the 
impossible possibilities – the presently non-realizable possibilities of reorganizing and 
questioning the inescapable difference of the human and the non-human/inhuman. The 
moment of literary points towards future possibilities of justice – justice that is 
annihilation of the present logic of difference and the coming of the unforeseeable. The 
unforeseeable is structured like terror but which never comes and which is deferred 
through an aporetic performance.  
 
 
Notes 
1.  “'I didn't think of Iraqis as humans,' says U.S. soldier who raped 14-year-old girl before killing 
her and her family.” Mail Online, 2011. 
2. This idea is there in several of Derrida’s texts. See Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The “Mystical 
Foundation of Authority”” in Acts of Religion; Rogues: Two Essays on Reason;  The Animal That 
Therefore I Am. 
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